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INTRODUCTION
Hypnosis.' Once the subject of derision, hypnosis is now a tool of
formidable utility.2 Hypnosis is utilized in areas as diverse as sports,
* Dr. Jack Fox (BA, Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles, 1949; Ph.D.,
Clinical Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles, 1959) was a Diplomate in both
Clinical Psychology and Clinical Hypnosis, as well as a Fellow of the American Psychological
Association. He served for many years as Chief Psychologist at Patton State Hospital and as
Clinical Professor of Psychology at the Fuller Theological Seminary Graduate School of
Psychology (Deceased July 15, 1988). Julian Fox is a candidate for a J.D. in 1989 at the
University of California, Davis.
1. Although practiced for centuries, it is unclear what hypnosis is. See Comment,
Excluding Hypnotically Induced Testimony on the "Hearsay Rationale," 20 VAL. U.L. REv.
619, 625 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Hearsay]. Webster's Dictionary defines hypnosis as
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education, dentistry, research, and the law .3 The technique's memory-
enhancing capabilities, however, raise a variety of difficult legal
questions. 4 This Article will explore these capabilities and the prob-
lems associated with them and will propose a new method for
alleviating those problems.
Like any other tool of substantial benefit, hypnosis entails potential
dangers. False recollections or "pseudomemories" may be induced
in witnesses whose recollections have been "enhanced." 5 Courts strike
various balances when determining whether to admit posthypnotic
testimony. No consensus has emerged, however, as to the reliability
of posthypnotic testimony, or as to its proper treatment in the judicial
system.
Courts can achieve uniformity by adopting the new standard of
hypnotic reciprocity. Both the prosecution and the defense should
hypnotize the same witness. A bilateral system of hypnosis would
"[a] state that resembles sleep but is induced by a hypnotizer whose suggestions are readily
accepted by the subject." Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a
Prospective Witness, 68 CALF. L. Rev. 313, 316 (1980) (quoting WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTiONARY 563 (1976)). The following characteristics were described by Professor Hilgard:
1) subsidence of the planning function (the subject loses initiative);
2) redistribution of attention;
3) availability of visual memories from the past and heightened ability for fantasy
production;
4) reduction in reality testing and a tolerance for persistent reality distortion;
5) increased suggestibility;
6) adoption of role behavior (subject will adopt a suggested role and carry on
complex activities in accordance with that role);
7) amnesia for what transpired within the hypnotic state (this is not an essential
aspect of hypnosis).
Diamond, supra at 316 (quoting E. HIGARD, THE EXPERImNCE OF HYPNOsis 6-10 (1963)).
2. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 318. Modern interest and research in hypnosis traces
back to the era of Franz Anton Mesmer, a Viennese physician who moved to Paris in 1778
and established a clinic for the practice of "animal magnetism." Id. From the time of Mesmer
to the present, controversy has surrounded the practice of hypnosis. Id. Periods of intense
interest were followed by condemnation as quackery. Id. With the advent of World War II
came a resurgence of interest in hypnosis, particularly as a tool for the treatment of "war
neurosis." W. MENmNGER, PSYCEATRY IN A TROtBLED WORLD 309-11 (1948). Since World
War II, hypnosis has continued to be effective as a tool for treating mental and emotional
conditions. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 320. Escaping the old charges of fakery, hypnosis
is now a legitimate subject of research among academic psychologists and clinicians. Id.
3. See W. KROGOER, CLnAc AND EXPERmENTAL HY'Nosis 115-117, (2nd ed. 1977); R.
UDOLF, FoRENsIC HYPNOSIS 4 (1983).
4. See generally Orne, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: Enhanced Memory or Tam-
pering with Evidence?, 51 NAT'L INST. OF JUST., IssUEs AND PRACTICEs, 1 (1985); Comment,
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony and the Balancing Pendulum, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 921
[hereinafter Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed]; Note, Evidence-Admitting Hypnotically Re-
freshed Testimony-State v. Haislip, 35 KA. L. REv. 219, (1986) [hereinafter Note, Haislip];
Comment, Hearsay, supra note 1, at 61.
5. Orne, supra note 4, at 11. Dr. Orne defines a pseudomemory as a false recollection
that may be brought about by confabulation, suggestion, and organic factors.
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enhance the reliability of the subject's testimony and promote accu-
rate assessment of the subject's memory status. Traditional ap-
proaches should therefore be re-evaluated in light of this proposal.
This Article consists of five sections. Part I begins with a brief
overview of the benefits and dangers associated with forensic hyp-
nosis. Part II then reviews the current judicial postures towards the
admissibility of posthypnotic testimony. Part III briefly discusses the
constitutionality of posthypnotic testimony. Part IV then presents
the concept of hypnotic reciprocity and demonstrates that forensic
hypnosis is more reliable in a bilateral context. Finally, Part V argues
that posthypnotic testimony should be generally admissible on a
bilateral basis.
I. THE BENEFITS AND DANGERS OF HYPNOsIs
During the 1970s, hypnosis was routinely used in criminal inves-
tigations. 6 Police hypnotists employed hypnosis to restore a witness's
memory of a crime.7 Hypnosis grew rapidly as a useful investigatory
technique, but doubts concerning the reliability of the technique grew
as well. 8 Legal questions arose as to the admissibility of hypnotically
influenced testimony. 9 Today, the law is in a state of flux. 0 Modern
courts consider both the benefits and the dangers of enhanced mem-
ory when determining admissibility standards."
Hypnosis can serve as a powerful enhancer of memory.12 Police
authorities use this tool to obtain new and otherwise unobtainable
6. See generally Monrose, Justice with Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hypnosis in
Law Enforcement, Jums DR., Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54. Hypnosis often triggers recollection of
the suspect's face. See Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1985).
7. See Clay, 771 F.2d at 1. Often, the witness hypnotized is the victim of the crime.
See, e.g. United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982);
Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969);
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Usually, the trauma of the incident induces
amnesia in the victim, rendering her unable to recall the critical facts. See Milos, Hypnotic
Exploration of Amnesia After Cerebral Injuries, 23 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERMNTAL
HYPNosis 103, 103 (1975). Dr. Martin Orne believes that hypnosis may be useful for restoring
memory following an accident or crime. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27
INT. J. CLInIcAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosIs 311, 317-318 (1979).




12. See Harker v. State of Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 1986). Various studies
have documented the effectiveness of hypnosis in criminal cases. See Orne, supra note 4, at
13. These studies consistently found that hypnosis provided valuable new information 60 to
90 percent of the time. ld.-
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evidence. 13 For example, in Chowchilla, California, twenty-six chil-
dren were kidnapped from a school bus, and the bus driver was able
to recall, under hypnosis, a license plate number which was instru-
mental in the capture of the kidnappers. 14 Many similar leads have
been uncovered in other hypnotic investigations.' 5
Unfortunately, the very process which enhances the witness's mem-
ory may induce "pseudomemories" as well. 16 Critical judgment is
suspended during hypnosis. 17 Subjects experience a heightened state
of suggestibility.18 In order to comply with the hypnotist's perceived
expectations, subjects may produce inaccurate recollections. 9 The
13. During the 1970s, police formed specially trained teams of hypnotists. Comment,
Hearsay, supra note I at 619. These teams were employed to enhance the memory of crime
victims. Id. Such cases generally involve a witness who viewed her assailant, but is subsequently
unable to recall the face either because the events happened too quickly or because the trauma
induced amnesia. Id.
14. See Comment, Hearsay, supra note 1, at 619 n.6; State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682,
686, 643 P.2d 246, 250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (reporting the facts of the Chowchilla kidnapping).
In July of 1975, Franklin Edward Ray (a bus driver) and the twenty-six children in his bus
were kidnapped outside of Chowchilla California. Later hypnotized, Ray was able to recall
five of the six digits on the license plate of the kidnapper's van. This proved to be a critical
breakthrough in the investigation. See Comment, Hearsay, supra note 1, at 619 n.6.
15. The use of hypno-investigators has reportedly led to hundreds of breakthroughs.
Comment, Hearsay, supra note I at 619 n. 6 (quoting Serril, Breaking the Spell of Hypnosis,
Tvne, Sept. 17, 1984, at 62). The use of hypno-investigators became so popular that even the
Federal Bureau of Investigation instructed some of its agents in hypnosis. Id. at 619 n. 1.
16. See supra note 6.
17. See Orne, supra note 4, at 6. During hypnosis a subject is highly susceptible to
suggestions. Id. Typically, these suggestions involve a subject's ability to experience alterations
in perception, memory, or mood. Id. Because the hypnotist defines what is to be experienced,
the hypnotic subject forgoes evaluation of both the nature of the suggestion and his reaction
to it. Id. Consequently, a person's private experience can be altered in a manner that is
uncritically accepted by the person. Id. at 7. This uncritical acceptance is further enhanced by
the subject's expectation of heightened memory, her desire to please the hypnotist, and by the
nature of the suggestions received. Id. Thus, a subject may give credence to memories so
vague and fragmentary that she would not have relied on them before being hypnotized. See
Diamond, supra note 1, at 337-38.
18. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (1984). A subject reacts even to
slight nuances in the hypnotist's words or manner while under hypnosis. Id. Following the
hypnotic induction, the subject's attention focuses intensely on the hypnotist, and there is an
increased tendency to please the hypnotist and to comply with both explicit and implicit
demands. Orne, supra note 4, at 8. Compliance is largely determined by both the subject's
expectations regarding the effects of hypnosis and the hypnotist's behavior. Id. at 8-9. A
subject's preconceptions can greatly enhance the impact of hypnosis on her willingness to
produce the desired and expected effects. Moreover, the hypnotist's expectations and desires
often result in implicit suggestions and unwitting cues which direct the subject's responses
during and after the hypnosis. See Harker v. State of Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir.
1986). The hypnotist's tone of voice and body language may communicate these cues. Id. The
subject subconsciously picks up these cues and says what she thinks the hypnotist wants to
hear. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 44, 641 P.2d 775, 801, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 269
(1982). The end result may be that the subject's description of the event departs from reality
to conform to the questioner's expectations. See Harker, 800 F.2d at 440.
19. See Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1246 (8th Cir. 1987); Harker, 800 F.2d at
440; Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201.
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subject may also confabulate or fill in gaps in her memory to make
her recall more coherent. 20 These suggestions and confabulations are
then hardened in the memory and asserted as absolute fact.21 Sub-
sequent to the hypnosis, the subject remains utterly convinced that
her assertions are true.2 Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between
memory enhancement and memory inducement.
Because memory enhancement and memory inducement are some-
times confused, the admissibility of posthypnotic testimony poses
dangers. Courts are unable to agree, however, whether these dangers
are offset by the benefits.? Consequently, several judicial positions
have emerged. These positions are discussed in Part II.
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
Courts agree that witnesses should not be allowed to testify while
under hypnosis.2 4 They also ban the use of out-of-court statements
made by a witness while under hypnosis as evidence of the truth of
the matters asserted.? Courts disagree, however, on whether testi-
20. See Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1246; Harker, 800 F.2d at 44; Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201;
see also Orne, supra note 4, at 10. Confabulation occurs when the subject fabricates missing
details by fantasy or by using parts of other real memories unrelated to the events in question.
See Harker, 800 F.2d at 440. These fabrications or distortions are not conscious lies-the
subject honestly reports them as real. Orne, supra note 4, at 10. The explicit or implicit
demands of the hypnotic situation often suggest to the subject that she accept the fabrications
as accurate. Id. at 11. Thus, the subject comes to view pseudomemories as genuine memories.
21. See Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1246; Harker, 800 F.2d at 440; Valdez, 722 F.2d at
1201. See also Diamond, supra note 1, at 334; Orne, supra note 4, at 25. After the hypnotic
session has ended, the subject may not remember being hypnotized. Diamond, supra note 1,
at 334. Moreover, she may be unable to distinguish between memories held prior to hypnosis
and those resulting from the hypnotic session. Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note
4, at 928. In addition, hypnosis can greatly strengthen the confidence of a subject without
regard to whether the memory was genuine or invented. Orne, supra note 4, at 25. Thus, a
witness may have an unshakable subjective conviction that lends him an aura of credibility.
See Harker, 800 F.2d at 440. The witness's ability to recall detail may further enhance
credibility, regardless of whether the witness is correct on substantive matters. Orne, supra
note 5, at 25. In the worst case, an eyewitness might inaccurately reconstruct the memory of
the crime, either by suggestion or confabulation, and then become convinced of its absolute
accuracy through memory hardening. Harker, 800 F.2d at 440.
22. See Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1246; Harker, 800 F.2d at 440; Valdez, 722 F.2d at
1201; see also Diamond, supra note 1, at 334; Orne, supra note 4 at 25.
23. See infra notes 27-61 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E. 2d 414 (1974); see
also Comment, Evidence: Placing Limits on the Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed
Testimony, 23 "WVAsdu.N L.J. 697, 697-98 (1984); Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 220.
25. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. 1975). See also Ruffra, Hypnotically
Induced Testimony: Should it Be Admitted?, 19 CinA. L. BULL. 293, 304-05 (1983).
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mony influenced by a previous hypnosis is admissible.26 This section
identifies five prominent admissibility standards.
A. Free Admissibility
In 1968, a Maryland case, Harding v. State,27 established the
majority rule of the state courts in the 1970s: hypnotically induced
testimony is admissible, with hypnosis as an element discounting
credibility. 28 This rule remains the law in numerous states and several
federal circuits today. 29 Perhaps its strongest appeal is that it complies
with the general trend toward opening the courtroom doors to all
relevant evidence for the jury's assessment. 0 From a practical point
of view, such evidence is often the crux of the prosecution's case.3
However, critics find several flaws with this position.
First, the jury may not be capable of assessing the impact of a
pre-trial hypnosis on a witness's credibility. 32 Technical testimony by
experts may be too abstract for a jury to understand or believe.
3
Moreover, the scientific aura of hypnosis may lead jurors to attach
undue weight to hypnotically influenced testimony.1
4
26. See infra notes 27-61 and accompanying text.
27. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
28. See Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 224.
29. See, e.g., Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d 242, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Awkard, 597 F.2d, 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); State v. Wren,
425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W. 2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Glebock, 616 S.W. 2d 897, 903-904 (renn. Crim. App. 1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d
1280, 1282 (Wyo. 1982).
30. See Ruffra, supra note 25, at 311; see also Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 224.
31. See Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 224; see also Ruffra, supra note 25 at 311; Dilhoff,
The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Ono N.U. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1977).
32. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 940; see also Note, "Chapman
v. State". Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony - An Issue of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983
UTAH L. Rav. 381, 386.
33. See generally Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 939-40.
34. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 929. Hypnotically enhanced
testimony, like other scientific processes, may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the
eyes of a jury of laymen." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Further complicating matters, many jurors believe that all perceptions are perfectly recorded
in the memory and that hypnosis can simply retrieve an accurate recording. See Comment,
Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 929. Recent scientific experiments, however, suggest
a reconstructive theory of memory. See R. UDOLF, supra note 3, at 29-31; see also Putnam,
Hypnosis & Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
437 (1979). Under this theory, memory is a constructive process by which information received
after an event is integrated by the mind into the memory representation of that event. United
States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, an individual's hypnotically
induced memory may be a product of both original recall and memory reconstruction. See
Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. Rav. 1203, 1216-18
(1981).
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Second, critics feel this position leaves too little discretion for the
court to exclude testimony when the prejudice of the evidence out-
weighs the potential benefits. 35 Thus, testimony contaminated through
impermissive hypnotic suggestions might become admissible. Admis-
sion of such testimony could prejudice the jury. Therefore, the free
admissibility approach offers the potential for the abuse of forensic
hypnosis.
B. Qualified Admissibility
A number of courts have admitted posthypnotic testimony only
on a qualified basis. Testimony qualifies for admission only if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
3 6
Testimony is thus evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than being
automatically admitted or excluded.
This approach has several advantages. Testimony produced from
a highly suggestive hypnotic encounter is excluded. Testimony for
which an independent basis of reliability is established, however, is
admissible. Thus, the jury participates in the fact-finding process
only when there is some reliable basis for determining the facts.
C. Conditional Admissibility
Some courts have required compliance with specific procedural
safeguards as a condition precedent to admissibility.17 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey pioneered this approach in the landmark deci-
sion of State v. Hurd.35 Hurd adopts a two-part test for admissibi-
35. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 940.
36. Under this standard, the probative value of the testimony would have to outweigh its
prejudicial effects in order to qualify for admission. See, e.g., McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d
951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987) (reliability evaluation); Wicker v. McCotter, 738 F.2d 487, 492-93
(5th Cir. 1986) (probative value of the testimony weighed against its prejudicial effect) cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(admissibility determination); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (1984)
(weigh "totality of circumstances"); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 690, 643 P.2d 246, 254
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (reliability determination).
37. The leading case in this line is probably State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981). See also Spryncznatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984);
State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 287, 475 N.E. 2d 805, 813 (1984); State v. Martin,
33 Wash. App. 486, 656 P.2d 526 (1983), rev'd, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984). The
state of Oregon has codified the procedural safeguard approach. Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.675
(1985).
38. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86.
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lity.39 First, the court determines whether hypnosis was an appropriate
method for refreshing the witness's recallA0 Second, the court assesses
whether the hypnotic procedures were reasonably reliable. 4' This
assessment includes mandatory compliance with six procedural safe-
guards recommended by Dr. Martin T. Orne.
42
First, a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist must perform the
hypnosis. Such interrogation increases the accuracy of hypnotic re-
call.4 1 Second, the hypnotist must be independent of the litigation.
This alleviates risks that the interest and beliefs of the hypnotist will
contaminate the witness's recollection."4
Third, law enforcement personnel can only supply the hypnotist
information in a recorded memorandum. 4 This facilitates a later
assessment of suggestiveness, as the court would know the extent of
information which the hypnotist could have given the subject.46 The
hypnotist is also required to record a statement of the subject's
prehypnotic memories.4' This fourth requirement provides a basis for
determining the extent of a subject's pre-hypnotic knowledge.48
Fifth, hypnotic sessions must be recorded so that the reliability of
the hypnotic encounter can be accurately assessed. 49 The court did
not, however, mandate a videotape as does Dr. Orne5 D Most com-
mentators agree with Dr. Orne, noting that any other method of
recording would inadequately disclose subtle cuing.', Finally, the
court provided that only the hypnotist and the subject could be
present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including prehyp-
notic testing and the posthypnotic interview.5 2 This requirement min-
imizes the risk of suggestive communication. 3
The procedural safeguard approach attempts to maximize the re-
liability of hypnosis. However, some courts doubt the wisdom of the
conditional approach. First, these procedural safeguards are hard to




43. Hurd at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
44. Id.




49. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
50. Id.
51. Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 942.
52. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
53. Id.
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administer.14 An otherwise easy procedure becomes a rigorous enter-
prise. Second, special hearings and appeals could escalate so that
"the game is not worth the candle." ' 55 Finally, even with the admin-
istration of these safeguards, the risk of hypnotic unreliability cannot
be totally eliminated.56 Thus, many courts have rejected the condi-
tional approach as either too cumbersome or too lenient.
D. Restricted Admissibility
Some courts allow previously hypnotized witnesses to testify, but
restrict their testimony to those matters remembered (and docu-
mented) prior to hypnosis.5 7 These courts view hypnotically induced
testimony as data gathered in a scientific experiment. 58 As such, the
testimony must meet the general admission standard applicable to
scientific procedures or techniques required by the Frye test.5 9 Under
Frye v. United States,6" evidence produced by a scientific technique
is admissible only when that technique is deemed reliable by the
relevant scientific community.6 1 Because hypnotic proceedings are not
considered generally reliable, posthypnotic testimony fails the Frye
test.62
Obviously, this approach goes a long way toward preventing the
admission of unreliable evidence. Some courts, however, are skeptical
of such generalized exclusions.6 3 Restriction of post hypnotic testi-
mony could seriously damage a prosecution case, especially if the
main witness (usually the victim) has little prehypnotic memory of
the events.64 Such testimony is not necessarily unreliable, especially
if it is confirmed by independent evidence. Thus, in their zeal to
promote reliability, courts might exclude valuable and relevant evi-
dence.
54. Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 226.
55. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 Cal. Rptr. 243, 787, cert. denied. 459 U.S.
860 (1982).
56. See Orne, The Use and Musme of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
ExPERIMENTAL HYPNosiS 311, 317-18 (1979).
57. See, e.g. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Quintanar,
659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984);
People v. Hughs, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
58. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 944.
59. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
61. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
62. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 945-46.
63. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
64. See Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 229.
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E. Inadmissibility
Some jurisdictions that adopt the Frye test ban previously hyp-
notized witnesses from testifying altogether.65 The question is seen as
a problem of competence, not credibility. 6 The suggestive effects of
hypnosis are regarded as so pronounced that the witness is contam-
inated.67 Even posthypnotic testimony corroborated by documented
prehypnotic statements is unacceptable. 68 Courts focus on the memory
hardening effects of hypnosis. 69 The entire testimony is clothed in an
artificial but impenetrable aura of certainty. 70 Opportunity for proper
cross-examination is impaired. 71 In short, these courts view hypnosis
as too dangerous for the courtroom.
Many courts find this position unacceptable. 72 Not only is evidence
which can be independently corroborated excluded, but testimony
tracing back to prehypnotic testimony is excluded as well. 7" There is
little doubt that reliable evidence is sacrificed for the simplicity of
this bright-line rule.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IssUES REGARDING POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of excluding
posthypnotic testimony in Rock v. Arkansas.74 In Rock, the defen-
dant, accused of killing her husband, underwent hypnosis to refresh
her memory.75 Subsequent to the hypnosis, she remembered details
indicating that her gun was defective and had misfired when her
husband hit her arm during a struggle. 76 An expert examined the gun
65. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert.
denied. 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), aff'd.
296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 7413
(1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W. 2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
66. See Note, Haislip, supra note 4, at 228.
67. Id. at 228-29.
68. See id.
69. See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 68, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 274, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 860 (1982).
70. Id.
71. See Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed, supra note 4, at 928.
72. See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying note 68.
74. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
75. Id. at 2706.
76. Id. at 2707.
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and corroborated that it had a tendency to misfire when dropped or
hit.77 Rock was not allowed to testify, however, because Arkansas
restricted posthypnotic testimony to events remembered and docu-
mented prior to hypnosis. 78 The Supreme Court overruled the state
decision and held that per se exclusion violated Rock's fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendment right to testify on her own behalf.
7 9
The decision in Rock was narrowly confined to the issue of whether
a criminal defendant's testimony could be arbitrarily excluded on a
per se basis.8 0 The Court did not address whether a witness's testi-
mony could be arbitrarily excluded." The decision does, however,
cast doubt upon the validity of per se exclusions. Such exclusions
were described as arbitrary, since corroborating evidence and other
means of assessing accuracy might render testimony reliable in an
individual case.Y
While the Court has never addressed the admissibility of a witness's
posthypnotic testimony, several federal circuits have addressed this
issue. 83 These courts held that admission of posthypnotic testimony
did not violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation
when: 1) the witness was cooperative; 2) experts were allowed to
testify as to the possible effects of hypnosis on a witness's memory;
and 3) the witness could be sufficiently cross-examined.84 Posthyp-
77. Id.
78. Id. The Arkansas Court banned admission of any testimony which could not be traced
to a documented prehypnotic memory. Id. The Arkansas Court relied on a California case,
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
860 (1982), for much of its reasoning as to the unreliability of hypnosis. But while the
California court adopted a stricter general rule-barring posthypnotic testimony entirely-it
explicitly exempted a defendant's testimony on her own behalf. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 723
P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
79. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
80. Id. at 2712. The Court explicitly states, "This case does not involve the admissibility
of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express
no opinion on that issue." Id. at 2712 n.15.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 2714.
83. See, e.g., Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (l1th Cir. 1988); Harker v. Maryland, 800
F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986); Beck v. Norris,
801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986); Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
84. See Bundy, 850 F.2d at 1415-16; Harker, 800 F.2d at 440; Wicker, 783 F.2d at 492;
Beck, 801 F.2d at 245; Clay, 771 F.2d at 4. See also McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951,
961-62 (4th Cir. 1987) (sixth amendment not violated where testimony resulting from a faulty
hypnosis is supported by considerable corroboration); Robinson v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501,
1508 (10th Cir. 1987) (admission of posthypnotic testimony is not constitutional error where
a reviewing court determines that adequate safeguards have been employed to insure reliability
of the testimony). In addition, the Eight Circuit has held that assistance of a hypnotic expert
in evaluating the credibility of posthypnotic testimony is a constitutional right, and such
expertise must be provided to indigent defendants. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244-
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notic testimony is therefore constitutionally permissible whenever
credibility may be adequately litigated.
IV. RECIPROCAL HYPNOSIS: AN OVERLOOKED FACTOR IN THE
RELIABILITY DEBATE
No general consensus concerning the admissibility of posthypnotic
testimony has emerged in the American legal system. States strike
various balances when weighing the benefits against the potential for
prejudice. Courts have uniformly misaddressed the problem, however,
by considering hypnosis in a unilateral context.
The current system of unilateral hypnosis is unfair because it tilts
the judicial system in favor of one side. Both sides bring in expert
witnesses to discuss the reliability of a hypnotic procedure performed
by one side.85 Tapes are presented of a hypnotic procedure performed
by one side.86 A witness's testimony is selectively enhanced by one
side.87 Reliability and fairness dictate that this system be changed.
Both sides should have the opportunity to enhance the witness's
memory. Both sides should have the opportunity to introduce vide-
otapes. Both experts should be able to testify based on a firsthand
examination of the witness. Only when these measures are imple-
mented will the jury have an adequate fact-finding basis.
In focusing exclusively on reliability, courts have overlooked the
issue of reciprocity. Reliability is in doubt, however, partly because
reciprocity is lacking. Unilateral hypnosis provides an imbalanced
perspective. A balanced perspective can be restored, however, by
viewing the subject's memory through a second hypnotic lens. Spe-
cifically, this Article proposes a five-stage technique of hypnotic
examination.88
45 (8th Cir. 1987). But see U.S. v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 1988) (a defendant
suffering memory loss is not automatically entitled to expert hypnotic assistance in order to
improve his recall).
85. Courts which admit posthypnotic testimony generally permit expert testimony regarding
the reliability of hypnosis. See, e.g., Harker, 800 F.2d at 440; Clay, 771 F.2d at 4. The Eighth
Circuit held that provision of an hypnotic expert to an indigent defendant is constitutionally
required where the victim's posthypnotic identification was the primary inculpatory evidence.
See Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1245.
86. See, e.g., Harker, 800 F.2d at 440; Clay, 771 F.2d at 4. Audio or video tapes of the
hypnotic procedure are admissible only for the purpose of evaluating the witness's credibility,
not as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted in the tapes. See Clay, 771 F.2d at 3.
87. 'Selective enhancement need not be deliberate. It is simply endemic to the hypnotic
procedure that the subject desires to please the hypnotist and will divulge or withhold
information in accordance with that desire. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
88. For a detailed description of the reciprocal hypnotic procedure, see Appendix. Briefly,
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The first four stages involve generating data. A subject is asked
to describe in gerneral terms what she believes happened. Then she
is asked to provide details of what she actually perceived. 9 A
regression through the events is followed by questions calling for
more detail.90 After all the data is generated, it is evaluated in stage
five. Information produced within the hypnotic session enables the
expert to analyze both the content of the subject's memory and the
origin of those memories. 91 Contradictions produced may be used to
apprise the jury of hypnotic dangers. 92
This reciprocal hypnotic technique will promote memory enhance-
ment, diagnostic assessment, and jury appraisal. These functions are
discussed below, focusing on how they affect the reliability of hyp-
nosis as a forensic tool.
the procedure is outlined as follows:
In stage one of the hypnosis, the subject will be asked to describe what she
believes happened concerning the events in question. In stage two, the subject will
be asked to record only those events which she actually perceived; namely, what she
actually saw, heard, felt, etc. If the answers to stage one and two are inconsistent
with each other, this indicates that the previous hypnosis induced fabrication of a
belief system within the subject.
Stage three involves a regression to the time of the events in question. The subject
is asked to relive the events in question and describe them aloud. Because the
perceived expectations and desires of the hypnotist are likely to be different than
under the prior hypnosis, the subject may produce a different set of recollections.
Those memories which remained constant between the two hypnotic sessions are
likely the product of original recall. Those which vary are likely confabulations.
Stage four will involve an amplification of detail. The subject will be asked to
remember the events in greater and greater detail. If the subject begins to contradict
herself or the known facts, this would cast doubts upon the reliability of the subject's
present memory and would suggest that this memory was likely a product of
suggestion and confabulation. Furthermore, faced with the demand for detail, the
subject might become less certain of her original identification. This would serve as
a diagnostic indication that the subject's unshakable certainty developed as an artifact
of the original hypnosis.
Stages one through four serve as the basis for stage five-the evaluation. Infor-
mation received regarding the content of the subject's memory is now used to
evaluate the status of the subject's memory. If the subject's answers remained
consistent within the hypnosis and did not contradict answers given in the previous
hypnosis, this would indicate that the subject was in fact reciting original recall and
that her memory was not altered by the first hypnosis. If, however, the subject
contradicts herself within the hypnosis and between the two hypnotic procedures,
her present recollection is probably based on confabulation rather than original
recall.
Id.
89. See id. and Appendix.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. A video showing a subject wildly confabulating would apprise a jury of hypnotic
dangers much more concretely than theoretical explanation.
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Hypnosis involves a diagnostic examination of the content of a
subject's memory. 93 That content might include memories suppressed
under the original hypnosis but elicited under a reciprocal hypnosis. 94
Thus, a reciprocal hypnotic examination may be of great value as a
memory enhancer.
As a tool of memory enhancement, reciprocal hypnosis will balance
an otherwise "loaded" recollection. 95 For example, a memory en-
hancement procedure conducted by the prosecution might elicit-
quite unintentionally-only those recollections favorable to the pros-
ecution. 96 Details favorable to the defense could remain suppressed.
97
A defense hypnosis of the same witness will balance the testimony
by providing an opportunity to elicit those details. This would
increase the reliability of the witness's testimony.
An examination of the content of the subject's memory is a
preliminary step in evaluating memory status. 9 A primary purpose
of reciprocal hypnosis is to indicate diagnostically whether the status
of the subject's memory content is that of original recall or confab-
ulation and memory hardening. Original sensory memory impressions
are not erased; 99 they may, however, be recalled in a modified
fashion. 00 Contradictions produced within the hypnotic session could
lead to the conclusion that the subject's recall is unreliable.' 0' The
absence of such contradictions would lead to a contrary conclusion. 02
Thus, reciprocal hypnosis would serve as a powerful tool for assessing
the impact of the original hypnosis on the subject's memory.
93. See supra note 85 and Appendix.
94. Id.
95. Details favorable to the prosecution are more likely to be forthcoming in a prosecution
hypnosis; likewise, details favorable to the defense are more likely to be elicited in a defense
hypnosis. Subjects are generally more willing to provide information if that information is
consistent with the perceived expectations of the hypnotist. Memory enhancement is thus a
selective process which can "load" a memory in the absence of reciprocity.
96. See supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 88 and Appendix.
99. Memory is generally thought to involve a reconstructive process; hynotically induced
recall is therefore thought to contain elements of both original memory and memory recon-
struction. See supra note 34.
100. The distinction between storage and recall is well recognized in the psyhological
literature. See J. HousToN, FUDAMENTAL oF LEMu'ima AND MEMORY 331 (1981). Many
memories which are stored are difficult to retrieve. M. RosEazWFIo & A. LEAN, PHYSOLOG-
IcAL PsYcHoLoGY 628 (1982). Experiments have shown that stimuli such as electroshock will
interfere with recall but not storage. J. KALAT, BioLOGIcAL PSYCHOLOoY 385 (1981). Memories
seemingly erased can often be retrieved under the influence of drugs, delay, or reminder
stimuli. Id.
101. See supra note 88 and Appendix.
102. Id.
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Finally, tapes of the reciprocal hypnotic proceeding will apprise
the jury in a concrete manner as to the practical limits and dangers
of hypnosis. Jurors sometimes exhibit an undue reverence for sci-
entific procedures.10 Upon exposure to tapes of the reciprocal ex-
amination, however, the jury may have direct visual or audio
information to the contrary. t 4 Contradictions produced within the
hypnotic proceeding would eliminate any belief that hypnosis can
produce perfect recall of a subject's perceptions or experiences.
Distorting aspects of hypnotic proceedings would be viewed in a
concrete context. The myth of the "mystic infallibility"10 5 of hypnosis
would be crushed under the weight of evidence. Thus, admission of
reciprocal hypnotic tapes would alleviate the danger of jury miscon-
ception.
While reciprocity would alleviate the problems associated with
selective memory enhancement and jury misconception, it is not
without dangers. The reciprocal procedure may itself alter the sub-
ject's memory. The following responses are made to this criticism.
First, reliability is a function of replication. Replication is science's
system of checks and balances for controlling and exposing experi-
menter and experimental artifacts.' °6 Consider, for example, the
"experimenter expectancy effect." 107 In the behavioral sciences, the
experimenter's hypothesis may unintentionally influence her behavior
towards the subject. 03 The subject responds to this behavior by
103. See supra note 34.
104. Tapes of the reciprocal hypnosis offer a concrete method of demonstrating the
fallibility of hypnosis to the jury. If the jury sees the subject contradicting herself or engaging
in wild confabulation, they will be skeptical of the hypnotic procedure. But if the jury only
sees tapes of the original hypnosis, abstract expert testimony regarding hypnotic dangers might
be disregarded. Jurors tend to be skeptical of psychological testimony in general and are more
likely to believe what they see with their own eyes than what they hear from an expert.
105. As one court noted, scientific processes may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility
in the eyes of a jury of laymen." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
106. R. ROSENTHAL & R. RoSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF BmAVoIR. RESEARCH 111 (1984).
107. Robert Rosenthal has repeatedly demonstrated this effect. See generally, R. ROSENTHAL,
EXPEI MENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIOR RESEARCH (1976). In one study, a dozen experimenters
were each to teach five rats to run a maze. Rosenthal, The Effect of Experimenter Bias on
the Performance of the Albino Rat, 8 BEHAVIORAL. SCIENCE, 183 (1963). Half of the experi-
menters were told that their rats had been bred to be "maze-bright." The remaining experi-
menters were told that their rats were bred "maze-dull." There was no actual difference
between the rats. Rats trained by experimenters expecting brighter behavior demonstrated
significantly superior learning compared to rats trained by experimenters expecting dull behav-
ior. Id.
108. R. RosENTHAL & R. RosNow, ESSaTIAs OF BEHAvoRAL REsEARCH 110 (1984). Perhaps
the classic example of self-fulfilling prophecy is the case of clever Hans. Hans, a horse, was
able to "verbalize" difficult mathematical calculations by tapping his hoof. He spelled, read,
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reacting in a manner tending to confirm the experimenter's hypnoth-
esis.'09 Replication with different experimenters is a common way of
controlling such artifacts."0
Second, memory alterations occurring during the reciprocal hyp-
nosis indicate that alterations probably occurred during the first
hypnosis."' A prosecution witness demonstrating a tendency to con-
fabulate under a defense hypnosis is certainly likely to confabulate
under a prosecution hypnosis." 2 Thus, a reciprocal hypnotic exami-
nation is required to adequately inform the jury of the critical facts.
Third, if hypnosis is useful to the prosecution as a memory-
enhancing technique, it is useful to the defense as well."' To allow
hypnosis on one side and not the other is blatantly discriminatory.
And finally, why should the adverse side bear all the risk? If the
prosecution introduces hypnotically influenced testimony, the prose-
cution should bear the risk that the subject's memory will be sub-
sequently altered upon reciprocal examination. It is procedurally
unfair to withhold from the defense the only technical means of
evaluating the reliability of the previous hypnosis." 4 Inherent risk
exists in the admission of posthypnotic testimony-and neither the
defense nor the prosecution should bear the entire burden alone.
At this point, critics will probably demur. Even if reciprocity
promotes reliability, they will argue that the time and expense of
litigation outweighs possible benefits. This is not a persuasive argu-
ment. Hypnotically influenced testimony is often used to prosecute
defendants accused of serious violent crimes.15 Criminal penalties
are substantial. If the testimony is important, the defense must have
the opportunity to accurately litigate the credibility issue. And if the
and solved problems of musical harmony. A distinguished panel of scientists ruled that no
fraud was involved. Pfungst, in a series of experiments, demonstrated that Hans could only
answer the questions when the questioner or experimenter himself knew the answer and was
within the horse's view. Id. at 110-11I. An unconscious forward movement of the experimenter's
head signaled Hans to start tapping. Id. at 11I. A tiny upward movement of the questioner's
head or a raising of his eyebrows signaled Hans to stop. Id.
109. See supra note 108.
110. R. RosBNTmu, supra note 106, at 111.
111. Certain subjects may be particularly responsive to suggestion. Excessive confabulation
during reciprocal hypnosis is evidence of a heightened susceptibility to suggestion. Possession
of this trait casts serious doubts upon the reliability of the original hypnosis.
112. Witnesses generally want to see crime solved and justice done. Orne, supra note 4, at
10. They tend to identify with the police or prosecution and will often volunteer under hypnosis
more than their meager memory warrants. Id.
113. See text accompanying notes 94-98.
114. The same argument applies to the hypnosis of a defense witness. It is procedurally
unfair to allow such a hypnosis unless the prosecution can perform a reciprocal hypnosis.
115. Orne, supra note 4, at 15.
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testimony is unimportant, it should be excluded on legal relevance
grounds.
V. RECIPROCAL ADm ssILITY: A NEW STANDnAD
The previous section demonstrated forensic hypnosis to be mark-
edly more reliable in a bilateral context. Because reliability is the
central issue in most admissibility cases, the concept of reciprocity
should fundamentally revolutionize admissibility standards. Per se
rules of admissibility or inadmissibility would be rendered obsolete.
This Article recommends a new uniform standard of reciprocal
admissibility, in which reciprocal hypnosis would be a condition
precedent to admissibility."
6
Evidentiary rules involving per se restriction or exclusion of post-
hypnotic testimony are over-encompassing. First, independent evi-
dence may exist which corroborates the witness's story." 7 Exclusion
of the testimony renders this other evidence less meaningful." 8 Sec-
ond, the hypnosis may have no appreciable effect on the witness's
memory. 1 9 And finally, the reciprocal hypnotic procedure provides
a reasonable basis for assessing the witness's reliability. 120 The arbi-
trary exclusion of potentially reliable evidence cannot be justified.
Likewise, rules of general admissibility are insufficient to promote
justice. Admission of posthypnotic testimony on a unilateral basis is
procedurally unfair. Both sides should have the opportunity to use
the same sorts of interviewing techniques. Failure to present such an
opportunity might violate defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
frontation.' 2' Thus, these courts will have to recognize the right of
reciprocal hypnosis as a prerequisite to admissibility.
116. While the right to conduct a reciprocal hypnosis would be absolute, that right could
be waived by the party possessing the right. Also, no witness should ever be forced to undergo
involuntary hypnosis. Failure to cooperate in a reciprocal hypnosis should merely result in
exclusion of the witness's testimony.
117. See text accompanying note 82.
118. The Court in Rock, for example, suggested that the "expert's description of the gun's
tendency to misfire would have taken on greater significance if the jury had heard [Rock]
testify that she did not have her finger on the trigger and that the gun went off when her
husband hit her arm." Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2712 (1987).
119. It is possible to undergo memory enhancement without having one's memory enhanced
or altered by the procedure.
120. See supra note 88 and Appendix.
121. See text accompanying note 84. Should a witness refuse to participate in a reciprocal
hypnosis, then one can argue that she is uncooperative. Experts can claim inadequate oppor-
tunity to expose the effects of hypnosis. Finally, cross-examination is insufficient since the
prosecution had access to a pre-trial interview technique unavailable to the defense. See id.
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Reciprocal admissibility is superior to either a standard of inad-
missibility or unilateral admissibility. Three questions, however, still
need to be addressed. First, should any procedural safeguards be
required in a bilateral system of hypnosis? Second, how much dis-
cretion should a judge have to exclude posthypnotic testimony? And
third, is reciprocity consistent with modern developments in consti-
tutional law?
Addressing the first question, complex and elaborate procedural
safeguards should not be compulsory. Compliance with elaborate
safeguards may be difficult, and proof of such compliance is even
more difficult. Errors in trial court rulings jeopardize otherwise
unimpeachable convictions. Procedural issues overshadow reliability
issues and generate a panoply of issues for appeal.
Two important safeguards are easily implemented, however, and
should be mandated. First, a videotape of each hypnotic session
should be required.'2 Second, only licensed psychiatrists or psychol-
ogists should administer the hypnosis.123 These safeguards will max-
imize reliability while minimally affecting determinations of proof.
Regarding the second question, judges must have some discretion
to exclude testimony. Litigation over reliability may be too costly or
burdensome for a particular case. Subjects may not cooperate during
the reciprocal hypnosis. 124 Testimony might be overly-prejudicial.
Under ordinary rules of evidence, the judge may exclude logically
relevant evidence when probative value is offset by other counter-
vailing factors. No special exception need be made to exclude post-
hypnotic testimony on grounds of legal irrelevance. The judge's
discretion should not be all-encompassing, however. The adversarial
system of reciprocity is best suited for determining questions of fact
in the absence of unusual circumstances.
Finally, a national system of hypnotic reciprocity is fully consistent
with recently developing constitutional law. The Supreme Court
122. Although the Hurd court required only audio tapes, a video tape is required for
accurate assessment of the hypnotic session. Orne, supra note 4, at 44. The influence of subtle
nonverbal cues can be profound and are not identifiable from an audio tape. Id. at 21.
123. Lay hypnotists do not have the requisite training in the relevant psychological issues.
Consequently, they are much more likely to conduct a suggestive hypnosis than a trained
psychologist or psychiatrist. Additionally, the strong interest of a police hypnotist in solving
a case is easily communicated to a subject and consequently is likely to alter her memory.
124. A more difficult problem arises when the subject cooperates but is unable to enter a
hypnotic trance. Failure to induce hypnosis could be the result of either poor hypnotic technique
or an unconscious reluctance to be hypnotized. The judge should have the discretion to either
exclude the testimony or admit it with a special cautionary instruction that it be viewed
skeptically.
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decision of Rock v. Arkansas'25 casts doubt upon the validity of
wholesale exclusion of testimony. A defendant's testimony may be
excluded only if the reliability of the witness's testimony cannot be
fairly and accurately litigated. 26 Likewise, the circuit courts require
fair and accurate opportunity to litigate as an admission require-
ment. Thus, the Constitution protects posthypnotic testimony only
when full litigation regarding the effects of hypnosis is possible. This
requires hypnotic reciprocity. Accurate litigation is possible only if
the witness cooperates with the hypnotic expert of the other side.'
28
That expert must have the opportunity to conduct a full and complete
examination. Without that opportunity, sufficient cross-examination
is impossible, adequate expert testimony is impossible, and reliability
assessment is severely impaired.
CONCLUSION
Scientists recognize dangers in using hypnosis to enhance mem-
ory.1 29 Courts strike various balances in weighing these dangers
against potential benefits. 30 Five dominant admissibility standards
have emerged.' 3 ' These five positions consider hypnotic reliability in
a unilateral context. The reliability of the fact-finding process would
be elevated, however, if hypnosis were administered bilaterally.
32
Traditional admissibility standards must therefore be re-evaluated.
Courts should promote reliability and uniformity by adopting a single
standard of hypnotic reciprocity.
125. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
126. See text accompanying note 82.
127. See text accompanying notes 81-84.
128. Adequate expert examination requires the witness's cooperation in a reciprocal hyp-
nosis.
129. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 24-73 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 24-73 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 85-115 and accompanying text.
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Appendix
A BRIEF OUTLINE oF THE APPLiCATION OF RECIPROCAL HYPNOSIS IN
ADVERSARIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
The purpose of the examination under hypnosis is to establish some
basis on which one may separate confirmed observations from uncertain
recollections and these from fabrications which may have been induced
by the subject's own bias or by the expectations of the person con-
ducting the hypnosis. The last may be elicited nearly directly, through
the asking of leading questions (i.e., "did he wear a coat?"), or very
indirectly, through the tone of the question, or from other behavioral
indicators. Typically, most hypnotic subjects exhibit a verbally unex-
pressed-and unconscious-need to please the examiner and produce
some phenomena which they believe will please the hypnotist. They
also tend to be more sensitive to subtle cues coming from the hypnotic
examiner-of which the examiner himself may not even be aware-
and respond to these cues. It is, therefore, extremely important that
all contacts between subject and examiner be very carefully recorded,
including all contacts before and after the hypnotic examination itself.
Preferably, such recording should be done, whenever possible, on
videotape. Ideally, there ought to be two cameras, one focused on the
subject, the other on the examiner. Because of the cost involved, this
ideal approach might be feasible only in major criminal cases or in
civil cases in which substantial assets or compensations are at stake.
The hypnotic examination must be carefully prepared and be based
on an analysis of what is known, including a thorough analysis of
previous hypnotic examinations.
Preceding the hypnotic examination itself, the examiner will, during
an interview with the subject, reinforce hypnotic susceptibility and
tentatively determine what kind of hypnotic induction procedure to use
initially.
The hypnotic examination itself should include two different proce-
dures: a memory procedure and a regression procedure. Each proce-
dure, in turn, is conceived as consisting of two phases, moving from
the more general in the first phase to the more specific in the second
phase.
The purpose of the memory procedure of the examination is the
determination of the extent and scope of the subject's recall about the
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events under question. The procedure is aimed, primarily, at cognitive-
intellective functions.
During the first phase of this procedure, the approach to the subject
will be in the most general terms possible, contingent upon the nature
of the events about which information is sought, and with the least
number of interventions by the examiner, aside from those which are
necessary to assure the more or less continuous flow of recollections.
In broad terms, the subject would be asked to provide a detailed
account of the incidents and events in question and, at the end of the
account, would be asked, whenever appropriate, to tell the examiner
what the subject thinks has happened. This latter question is designed
to make manifest the subject's belief system about the events, and the
responses may help later, in the analysis, to separate personal biases
from hypnotically induced conceptual spectacles.
After completion of the first phase, it may be necessary for the
hypnotic session to be interrupted, in order to provide the examiner
with an opportunity to organize and analyze the material produced,
collate it with the material prepared earlier, and plan the systematic
examination of the patient's production during the second phase of
the examination. The focus of this phase is not on a general account,
which was the objective of the first phase, but an emphasis on
perceptual recollections of greater and greater detail. The subject will
be asked to provide details of what she saw, heard, or felt (tactually
and kinesthetically). Since a number of the questions asked by the
examiner will be different in form as well as content from the questions
asked during the previous hypnotic examination, a new set will be
established which is different from the set which was formed during
the first hypnotic examination and, consequently, may tend to coun-
teract the artificial degree of certainty which could have been established
during the first examination. Thus, the first phase sets the stage for
the second phase, which ought to provide a great deal of discreet and
specific information-the nuts and bolts to be classified and ordered
later during the analysis and evaluation.
The purpose of the regression procedure is to place the subject in a
relatively safe situation where the subject can re-live and re-experience
the incidents and events under consideration. While the first procedure
focused primarily on cognitive-intellective processes, this procedure
concentrates on a more global experience, including affective and
emotional reactions to the events. In general, this procedure tends to
be more stressful to the subject, and, therefore, it is not accidental
that it follows the memory procedure-it should not, under ordinary
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circumstances, precede the latter. Since it is more stressful to the
subject, and the stress may have to be dealt with during the course of
the examination in a way helpful to the subject, hypnotic explorations
should not be undertaken by anyone not qualified and licensed to
provide psychological treatment.
In the regression procedure, the examiner functions primarily as one
who manipulates the subject's time frame. Initially, during the first
phase, the examiner will return the subject to a time of personal
enjoyment or gratification, such as a birthday celebration-selected
during the pre-hypnotic interview-prior to a return to the critical
incidents. This pleasant re-experience will provide the subject with an
opportunity to become acquainted with and understand what takes
place during a regression procedure. It also gives the examiner the
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the induced state. After
passing 4luickly through this pleasant event, the time frame will be
moved forward to the time of the very beginning of the critical incidents
and events. The stage is set so that the subject describes her experiences
in the present tense, just as if she were there. Again, during this first
phase, the subject will be asked in the most general terms to provide
a running description of the setting, of what takes place, of her
observations, and of her reactions to the incidents and events which
are happening. By and large, the examiner should restrict her interven-
tions to those which keep the subject's running comments going and
keep the subject moving through the time frame to the end of the
critical events relevant to this particular subject. Once more, the
hypnotic session may be interrupted at this time to give the examiner
the opportunity to review and organize the productions during this
phase and to prepare in detail the approach during the next phase.
In the second phase of the regression procedure, the examiner should
return the subject to specific occurrences, at each of which the subject
will be asked to provide more detailed descriptions of the occurrence,
her observations, and her reactions. Thus, the focus is on re-living the
occurrence more intensely and a more detailed running description of
the subject's observations and reactions. It is almost needless to say
that the occurrences must be carefully selected and be limited to those
which appear to have substantial promise and significance. To use an
unplanned random approach will merely overburden the subject and
result in a mass of undigestible data.
The two procedures may not be applicable to all subjects. They
require different depths of hypnosis. In general, the regression proce-
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dure requires a greater depth of hypnotic trance than the memory
procedure. Consequently, fewer people will be suitable for the regression
technique than for the memory procedure.
After the last hypnotic session is over, one begins with the collation,
classification, analysis, and evaluation of data from all sources, in-
cluding all information from the two hypnotic procedures, the previous
hypnosis, and data gleaned from other sources. What will emerge are
some major categories. The largest one will consist of observations
which are consistent from procedure to procedure and from one
hypnosis to the other. This consistency suggests strongly the reliability
of the subject's recollections. Then there will be a category of obser-
vations that were reported in the second hypnosis and not in the first,
or were not present in the memory procedure but were made in the
regression procedure. All these will be elaborations of observations
made before. One should be able to classify these into at least three
sub-types. (1) Elaborations that enhance the first report and are con-
sistent (occur in second phase of both procedures, for example). We
may be able to accept these as reliable. (2) Elaborations that introduce
some new elements which have heuristic value. These point to elements
known to others (e.g., the police) but not known to the subject; or
they seem to point in the direction of new discoveries of data or other
evidence. (3) Elaborations that may be consistent with the subject's
biases or the examiner's expectations. These must be viewed with
caution and suspicion but could turn out to be valuable and valid.
Then there may be a category of observations that fill large gaps in
what is known and have a quality of tenuousness, thinness, tangenti-
ality, wildness, or unexpectedness about them. These may very well be
the subject's confabulations (artificial, invented fll-ins) created to
satisfy the supposed need of the examiner for a continuous account or
story. They must be viewed with a great deal of suspicion and reser-
vation.
Then there will be a category of contradictions. Here we must
separate minor from major contradictions. The more detailed obser-
vations are produced and available, the more minor discrepancies are
to be anticipated. Human memorial functions are not like tape record-
ings, and hypnosis does not induce a replay of tapes. These minor
discrepancies must be accepted for what they are: minor discrepancies.
More striking substantial contradictions, on the other hand, must be
taken seriously. They strongly suggest the presence of confabulatory
elements in one or the other, or in all the accounts of these particular
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sub-events. These examples of categories do not, of course, exhaust
the number of categories possible. They are merely meant as examples
and illustrations.
One more comment on the affective and emotional components
elicited during the regression procedure: They will play an important
role in the evaluation of the results. Emotions which are appropriate
in intensity and kind to the described situations would tend to strengthen
the belief in the veridicality of the observations. Strong affects of
anxiety, fear, or shock may suggest that apparent gaps in memory are
not accidental but may have strong psychological motivations. They
indicate that these gaps are taboo for the examiner. To pursue them
willy-nilly might be quite harmful to the mental and emotional well-
being of the subject, and their unravelling is better left to a sustained
psychotherapeutic endeavor.
It is possible that some subjects have strong sympathies with one
side and not with the other. If this is so, the subject may not be
amenable, or may not be as amenable, to the induction and use of
hypnosis by an examiner who represents the other side, that is, the
side for which the subject does not feel sympathy or toward which she
may even feel antipathy. If this seems to be the case, then one must
consider that the subject is "resistant" to the hypnotic inquiry and her
testimony must be viewed with some healthy skepticism. On the other
hand, one must not arrive at such a conclusion too readily. The fact
is that hypnotic examiners, like other professional experts, differ in
their skills and what one observes may not be "resistance" per se, but
a response to inadequate skills. Furthermore, subjects react to other
differences between examiners, such as sex, age, attitude, induction
technique, and to other more subtle factors, which one may not be
able to delineate very readily. The point is that one must not rush
hastily to the conclusion that the subject is "resisting." Such a conclu-
sion must be arrived at in a very deliberate and careful fashion.
